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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Respondent, j 
V • t 
DAVID DAVIS, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
i Case No. 890009-CA 
t Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of a third degree 
felony in the Second District Court. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann* S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violate 
the privilege against self-incrimination? 
2. Is the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act void for 
vagueness? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of all relevant statutes is contained in the 
argument portion of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with distributing or possessing 
cocaine without affixing the appropriate stamps, a third degree 
felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-106 (Supp. 1989). 
Defendant entered a conditional no contest plea# reserving the 
right to appeal the trial court's ruling that the Utah Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act is constitutional. Judge Hyde stayed 
imposition of sentence (T. 7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Drug Stamp Tax Act does not require an individual 
to provide incriminating information. In fact, the act 
specifically provides that an individual need not provide such 
information and, therefore, does not violate the Utah or United 
States Constitutions. 
The Act makes it unlawful for persons to possess or 
distribute drugs without affixing the tax stamp to them. The act 
does not make it unlawful to misplace the tax stamp on the drugs 
and, therefore, it is not vague for failing to provide guidance 
as to where on the drugs to affix the stamp. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
Defendant alleges that the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax 
Act (the Act) violates the Utah and United States Constitutions 
by requiring him to provide information that will incriminate him 
in order to comply with the Act. Defendant's analysis of the Act 
ignores provisions that distinguish it from others that have been 
found to violate the Fifth Amendment. A review of the Act 
The District Court failed to transmit the information and the 
judgment with the record on appeal. The State has filed a 
request that these documents be transmitted by the district court 
clerk. The State agrees that defendant entered a conditional 
plea and, thereby, reserved his right to appeal the 
constitutional issue. 
_o_ 
reveals that it violates neither the United States nor the Utah 
Constitutions. 
In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968), 
the United States Supreme Court held that the government may tax 
illegal activities. What the government may not do is establish 
a method of taxation that violates the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
Thus, the issue in this case is not whether the State may impose 
a tax on illegal drugs, but whether the method of collecting and 
administering the taxes requires a person to provide information 
that incriminates him. 
The tax at issue in Marchetti was levied on persons 
engaged in gambling. The federal law required the IRS to provide 
a list of taxpayers to prosecutors who requested it, required the 
taxpayer to display a stamp indicating payment of the tax in 
their business establishment or to provide it to treasury 
officers upon demand, and allowed prosecutors to use evidence 
that the accused possessed a stamp to prove guilt in a 
prosecution for engaging in illegal gambling. All of these 
requirements violated the Fifth Amendment because they required 
the accused to provide information that was incriminating in a 
prosecution for engaging in the taxed activity. 
Marchetti established three areas of inquiry for 
determining whether a tax law violates the Fifth Amendment; (1) 
Is the tax in an area permeated with penal laws and, therefore, 
directed towards a select group inherently suspected of criminal 
activity? (2) In order to comply with the tax law, is one 
compelled to provide information that he might reasonably suppose 
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will be available to prosecutors? (3) Does the compelled 
information prove a significant link in the chain of evidence 
tending to establish guilt? 
The Utah Act does not satisfy the second and third 
elements and is, therefore, constitutional. Here, Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-19-105(3) (Supp. 1989) states that illegal drug dealers are 
not required to give any identifying information to the tax 
commission. Nothing in the Act requires the tax commission to 
provide information to prosecutors. Nothing in the Act or 
anywhere in the criminal code affirmatively allows prosecutors to 
use the fact that a person paid the tax as proof of any element 
of a criminal offense. Thus, information obtained as a 
consequence of the Act is not readily available to assist 
enforcement of laws prohibiting possession or distribution of 
illegal drugs as was information obtained as a consequence of the 
wagering tax laws in Marchetti. Compare Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 
47 with Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-105 (Supp. 1989). 
Defendant complains that the Act's requirement that he 
affix the stamps evidencing payment of the tax to the drugs 
violates the Fifth Amendment because it would be an admission 
that he knew that the drugs were illegal. Defendant's assertion 
would be true if the prosecutor were allowed to use the stamp for 
proof of this fact in a criminal prosecution. However, the Act 
does not provide that a prosecutor may use the stamps in this way 
and Marchetti precludes the prosecutor from doing so. 
Defendant's argument, framed in the negative, that the act does 
not make the evidence inadmissible does not serve to invalidate 
the Act because this Court should, whenever possible, construe 
statutes in a manner that renders them constitutional. State v. 
Packard, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1952). 
Because the Utah Act is distinguishable from the 
Marchetti laws, it satisfies the Fifth Amendment. Nothing in the 
Act requires an individual to provide incriminating information 
to the State in order to comply with the act, and defendant's 
contrary assertion is meritless. 
Defendant also argues that the Act violates Utah Const, 
art. I, S 12 by requiring him to give evidence against himself. 
As defendant notes, art. I, S 12 is limited to testimonial 
evidence; i.e. evidence that discloses to law enforcement a 
defendant's own thoughts that might be incriminating. American 
Fork City v. Crosqrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1985), Stewart, 
J. concurring. 
The issue here is not whether the evidence, if provided 
by the defendant, would have been testimonial in nature, but it 
is whether the Act requires defendant to provide evidence against 
himself at all. The analysis provided above under the Fifth 
Amendment is instructive here. The Act does not require 
individuals to provide evidence against themselves. The Act 
specifically states that an individual is not required to 
identify themselves to the tax commission. Moreover, the 
prosecutor is not authorized to use the fact that an individual 
paid the tax as evidence that he knew he possessed or distributed 
illegal drugs. The purchase of the stamps is an admission of 
illegal activity only if it is actually used as such. Where the 
tax commission does not know the identity of the purchaser, it 
cannot pass on that information to law enforcement. Where the 
State does not use the fact of purchase to prove any element of a 
criminal offense, it has not used any information provided by an 
individual to incriminate him. Therefore, the Act does not 
require an individual to provide anything either directly or 
indirectly that would incriminate him. It is, consequently, 
viable under art. I, S 12 as well as the Fifth Amendment. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
Defendant claims that the Act is unconstitutionally 
vague under the Due Process clauses of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. He complains that, although the Act requires him 
to affix the stamp evidencing payment of the tax to the package 
containing illegal drugs, it does not state where on the package 
the stamp is to be affixed. He asserts that he, therefore, is 
unable to understand what conduct is prohibited and that law 
enforcement may engage in arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement of the statute. This assertion lacks substance and 
should be disregarded. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, due process 
requires that "'[n]o one may be required at peril of life, 
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statues.'" State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1987), 
quoting United States v. Batchelderf 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). 
Statutes must define a criminal offense "with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 466 U.S. 352, 
357 (1983); see also State v. Fontanaf 680 P.2d 1042# 1050 (Utah 
1984); State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952). 
Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-105(1) (Supp. 1989) states: 
When a dealer purchases, acquires, 
transports, or imports into this state 
marihuana or controlled substances, he shall 
permanently affix the official indicia on the 
marihuana or controlled substances evidencing 
the payment of the tax required under this 
chapter. No stamp or other official indicia 
may be used more than once. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 1989) imposes criminal 
sanctions for failing to affix the official indicia. It 
provides: 
In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a 
dealer distributing or possessing marihuana 
or controlled substances without affixing the 
appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia 
is guilty of a felony of the third degree 
Defendant complains that the tax commission has not adopted a 
uniform system under Utah Code Ann. S 59-19-104(1) (Supp. 1989) 
for affixing the stamps, labels or other indicia to the drugs and 
that, therefore, he did not know where to place the stamps and 
law enforcement did not know where to look for the stamps. This, 
he urges, voids the statute and relieves him of criminal 
responsibility for failing to obtain the stamps. 
The criminal sanction is imposed not for misplacing the 
stamps or labels or other indicia on the drugs but for failing to 
affix them at all. Defendant's argument might be well-taken if 
the State was able to prosecute him for misplacing the official 
indicia on the drugs. Defendant does not claim that he purchased 
the required indicia and then did not know what to do with it. 
He failed completely to pay the drug tax. The offense with which 
defendant is charged is clear: failure to affix the indicia to 
the drugs is a third degree felony. Law enforcement officers 
look on the drugs to see if the official indicia is affixed to 
them. The law is sufficiently definite for defendant to know 
what he did wrong; i.e. he failed to affix the official indicia 
that he paid the drug tax to the drugs. It is also sufficiently 
definite for law enforcement officers to know where to look for 
the official indicia; they look on the drugs. The statute is not 
void for vagueness simply because the tax commission has not 
adopted a uniform system of affixing the official indicia to the 
drugs. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to uphold the Utah Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act and to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
DATED this /2> #j day of October, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
A L. $JpGR_.^ 
tant Attorney General 
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